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I. INTRODUCTION
The Dissolution of Marriage Act, chapter 61 of the Florida Statutes
(1971), was widely heralded as a "no-fault" divorce act, and it was the
belief of many (including this author) that it would no longer be necessary
for lawyers in dissolution actions to introduce evidence as to the marital
transgressions of the parties in order for the courts to find that marriages
were irretrievably broken. This belief was destroyed by the Supreme
Court of Florida's decision that in all dissolution of marriage cases
(whether contested or uncontested) "all of the surrounding facts and
circumstances are to be inquired into to arrive at the conclusion as to
whether or not indeed the marriage has reached the terminal stage based
upon facts which must be shown."' Subsequent to this decision, the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held (in reversing the trial court
judge) that the following facts pointed to an irretrievably broken mar-
riage:
The wife filed her petition to dissolve the marriage because it
was irretrievably broken. The husband answered admitting said
allegation .... At final hearing the wife testified the marriage
was irretrievably broken because she no longer loved her
1. Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266, 271 (Fla. 1973), followed in Simmons v. Simmons, 279
So. 2d 351 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
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husband and could not live with him. Further inquiry developed
that he had physically abused her during the marriage and that
he paid little or no attention to their children; that they had
spent untold hours discussing their problems, always without
success; that she had suffered mental and physical abuse from
him she would never forget; that he had sued her once before
for divorce. The trial judge then interrogated the husband who
stated essentially that at one time he had tried to get her to
seek counselling without success; that in view of her steadfast
position for some five months that the marriage was broken,
he did not feel they could put it back together. The chancellor
then announced he would require them to seek counselling in the
hope the marriage might be saved. From such a judgment
ordering counselling and withholding a determination as to
the termination of the marriage, the wife appealed and the
husband joined with her in the appeal.'
A cursory glance at the above quotation reveals that the wife
proved a case of "extreme cruelty" under former section 61.041(4) of
the Florida Statutes (1970 Supp.). Thus, the courts have resurrected the
old "fault" approach.
In a more encouraging vein, the courts have seemed to follow the
teachings of the new act in treating the spouses equally in the awarding
of alimony, child custody and support, etc.
II. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
A. Jurisdiction
Normally, the death of either party to a divorce action terminates
further proceedings in the action; however, the case of Taylor v. Wells'
presented an exception (in a case of apparent first impression in the
United States) to this rule. A husband brought suit for divorce against
his wife. A default was entered against the wife for her failure to file an
answer. Within the ten day period provided for by rule 1.540(b) of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the attorney for the wife moved to
set aside the default because of excusable neglect on his part in marking
his calendar. The husband died on the same day that the hearing on
this motion was conducted, and the wife contended that inasmuch as
property rights were concerned the divorce should be set aside. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, First District, agreed with the wife's contention
and held that the divorce should be set aside and that she be permitted
to file an answer and to introduce evidence (within limitations articulated
by the court) dealing with the allegations of the deceased husband's com-
plaint.
"[N] ormally, and perhaps presumptively, but not inevitably, a wife
2. Nelms v. Nelms, 285 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
3. 265 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
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acquires her husband's domicile upon marriage."' 4 However, when an
English husband furnished a marital home in England, and the wife
lived there only briefly and maintained a home in Florida for her minor
children by a prior marriage in accordance with a court decree, a deter-
mination that she had not given up her Florida domicile was supported
by the law and the facts.
B. Venue
In a case of first impression under the Dissolution of Marriage Act,
the District Court of Appeal, Second District, has held that the county
where the marriage is alleged to have become irretrievably broken con-
stitutes the place where the cause of action accrued under the Florida
venue statute, section 47.011 of the Florida Statutes (1971). This place
where the marriage became irretrievably broken may not necessarily
be the county in which the parties lived together. For example, if the
wife leaves the marital home in Polk County and moves to Hillsborough
County where the husband embarrassed her at her place of employment,
then the cause of action arose in Hillsborough County
A defendant who has resided in a rest home in Orange County,
Florida since 1966 is a resident of that county for venue purposes in a
dissolution of marriage action even though his legal residence or domicile
might be in Lake County, Florida.!
A wife who has been granted a judgment of separate maintenance
in Escambia County does not have a venue privilege as a defense to her
husband's petition filed in Volusia County which sought modification of
the judgment of separate maintenance and dissolution of the marriage
when the husband was a resident of the latter county. The venue was
properly laid as to the husband's modification cause of action and even
though venue was improper as to the husband's dissolution action, when
venue is proper as to at least one of the causes of action the motion to
dismiss for improper venue must be denied.'
C. An Irretrievably Broken Marriage
In a case of first impression in Florida, the District Court of Appeal,
First District, has attempted to define the legislative concept of an "ir-
retrievably broken marriage." A trial court had dismissed a dissolution
petition on the ground that the marriage of 39 years had not been ir-
retrievably broken. The appellate court reversed, holding that the
standard should be a subjective rather than an objective one. "If refusal
of dissolution would amount to a legal perpetuation of a relationship
4. Ashmore v. Ashmore, 251 So. 2d 15, 16 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971) (emphasis in original).
5. Arnold v. Arnold, 273 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
6. Hunt v. Hunt, 280 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
7. Costner v. Costner, 263 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
which has ceased to exist in fact, the petition should be granted."'8 In
every case
the important issue is the possibility of a reconciliation and the
marriage as a whole must be considered. Before dissolution is
granted, the court should be satisfied that the parties can no
longer live together because their difficulties are so deep and
substantial that no reasonable effort could eradicate them so
as to enable the parties to live together in a normal marital
relationship. If the trial judge doubts the petitioner's testimony
that his or her marriage has irretrievably broken down, he
should continue the proceedings to determine if reconciliation
is possible.9
It is interesting to contrast the opinion of the majority with the
dissenting view of Spector, J., which seems to be a retreat to the past.
Justice Spector cited pre-Dissolution Act cases for the proposition that
"it would be aiming a deadly blow at public morals to decree a dissolu-
tion of the marriage contract merely because the parties requested it."'1
It may be "a deadly blow at public morals," but the Dissolution of
Marriage Act would seem to express the policy that a dissolution should
be granted if the marriage "has ceased to exist in fact.""
The Supreme Court of Florida has upheld the constitutionality of
the Dissolution of Marriage Act by holding that it does not unconstitu-
tionally impair the obligation of the marriage contract nor adversely
affect property rights of the parties; that it is not unconstitutionally
vague, uncertain and indefinite, and that it does not unconstitutionally
apply retroactively to marriages entered into prior to its effective date.
The author has no quarrel with the court's holdings; however, the court's
discussion of the concept that the marriage is "irretrievably broken"
is less than clear. The court stated that the petition for dissolution need
simply allege that the marriage is irretrievably broken, and that the
granting of the petition is not dependent upon any showing of fault.
However the court states:
It is suggested by the appellant that a circuit judge would
hesitate to adjudicate that a marriage is not "irretrievably
broken" under the present statute when the petitioner simply
says that is the fact; that the judge becomes nothing more than
a ministerial officer receiving the "irretrievably broken" message
and having so received it, being thus compelled to drop this
legislative guillotine upon the marriage, thus excising the trou-
blesome mate from the petitioner because the petitioner has
subjectively and unilaterally determined that his marriage is
irretrievably broken.
8. Riley v. Riley, 271 So. 2d 181, 183 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1972).
9. Id. at 183.
10. Id. at 183-84.
11. Id. at 183.
FAMILY LAW
We do not view the matter of dissolution as being such a
simple, unilateral matter of one mate simply saying "I want
out." All of the surrounding facts and circumstances are to be
inquired into to arrive at the conclusion as to whether or
not indeed the marriage has reached the terminal stage based
upon facts which must be shown. Even in uncontested dissolu-
tions, the court would properly make inquiry to determine this
fact, for the statute itself in section 61.052 provides in sub-
section (2) the basic predicate: "Based on the evidence at the
hearing. . . .[and even] (a) ...if the respondent does not
, * * deny that the marriage is irretrievably broken, the court
shall enter a judgment of dissolution of the marriage, if the
court finds that the marriage is irretrievably broken."'"
D. Evidence
The Supreme Court of Florida, in upholding the District Court
of Appeal, First District, has held that evidence consisting of telephonic
conversations between a wife and her lover which were obtained by the
husband tapping the family telephone without the knowledge of the wife
are not admissible into evidence under section 934.01(4) of the Florida
Statutes (1971), which provides that the interception of telephonic
communications should not be allowed without a court order when none
of the parties to the communication has consented to the interception. 3
Admissions of adultery as revealed in diary entries made by the wife
together with corroborating testimony by private investigators that the
alleged paramour was in the woman's home for entire evenings and into
the morning hours are sufficient to lead the guarded discretion of a
reasonable and just man to a finding that adultery had been proven. 4
E. Defenses
In a case of first impression decided under the Dissolution of Mar-
riage Act, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, has held that
sexual relations indulged in by the parties during separation are not
enough without a clear showing of intent to reconcile to deny a dissolution
of marriage. Further, the trial court should not deny dissolution of the
marriage with prejudice; the trial court judge may either deny dis-
solution or, if he is in doubt, should continue the proceedings for not
more than three months to enable the parties to reconcile or order
either or both parties to consult professional counselors. 5
12. Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266, 271 (Fla. 1973) (original emphasis), followed in
Simmons v. Simmons, 279 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
13. Markham v. Markham, 272 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1973), aff'g 265 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1972).
14. Leonard v. Leonard, 259 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
15. Nooe v. Nooe, 277 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
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F. Procedure
Section 57.081(1) of the Florida Statutes (1971) provides that
insolvent persons having claims shall receive the services of the sheriff
in serving summons in the county in which the insolvents reside without
any charge. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that
although this statute, by its wording, is limited to the county in which the
insolvent resides, it would be a denial of due process to hold that an
insolvent of one county is not entitled to have the sheriff of another county
serve without charges a summons upon the insolvent's spouse in a dis-
solution of marriage case. As a result, the court issued a writ of mandamus
to compel the sheriff of St. Lucie County to serve a summons upon the
husband at the request of the wife who was a resident of Dade County,
Florida.16
When a trial court judge resigns his position before signing a final
decree of divorce, a successor judge does not have the power to sign a
valid final judgment which was drafted by the first judge even though the
first judge states in an affidavit that he had mentally decided the case
and that the drafted final judgment was in accordance with his mental
decision. The case must either be retried before a successor judge or the
parties may stipulate that the successor judge may decide the case in
whole or in part based upon the transcript of the original trial.'7
It is permissible for a trial court to strike the wife's pleadings and
to enter a default against her because of her failure to abide by a court
order which deals with discovery.' 8 A trial court has the power to enjoin
a wife from further prosecution of additional proceedings to enforce
rights which she has already litigated in dissolution proceedings. 9
G. Collateral Attack
Under the usual rule in Florida, a stranger to a divorce judgment can
impeach the judgment only when enforcement of the judgment is at-
tempted so as to affect the previously acquired rights or interests of the
attacker. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that this
rule does not prevent children of a deceased testator from showing that
the alleged widow of the deceased (their step-mother) was not the widow
because she had never received any kind of judicial decree in the courts
of Mexico divorcing her from her first husband. The children were not
attempting to attack a divorce judgment, but rather they were attempting
to show that no judgment had ever been entered.2°
The District Court then certified to the Supreme Court of Florida
16. State ex rel. Shellman v. Norvell, 270 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
17. Silvern v. Silvern, 252 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
18. Azar v. Azar, 263 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
19. Herskowitz v. Herskowitz, 281 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
20. In re Estate of Kant, 265 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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that it had passed on a question of great public interest in that it held
that
the heirs-at-law of a deceased may show the fallaciousness of
a purported judgment of divorce between the purported widow
and her former husband when such attack is necessary to show
that the purported widow is not the true widow of the de-
ceased.2'
The supreme court affirmed the district court and held that the
heirs-at-law had standing to collaterally attack the purported Mexican
divorce judgment on the ground that it was void (not merely voidable)
and that they were financially affected by the judgment insofar as their
rights to take by inheritance from their deceased father were concerned.
H. Legislation
Service of process may now be used for the dissolution or annulment
of marriages.2
III. ALIMONY
A. Jurisdiction
When a non-resident husband has real property in Florida, a Florida
court which has jurisdiction over the wife and the marital res may
enter a decree dissolving the marriage and awarding alimony and child
support to be paid out of the property, but it may not order the husband
to pay alimony and child support unless personal jurisdiction is obtained
over him.23
A successor trial court judge may not upon motion clarify a final
dissolution of marriage judgment so that additional substantial obliga-
tions will relate back to the date of the entry of the original final judg-
ment. Under section 61.14 of the Florida Statutes (1971) the successor
trial court judge may modify the judgment prospectively, but he cannot
change it retroactively.24
B. Reservation of Jurisdiction to Award Alimony
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that a trial
court in a dissolution of marriage action is not required as a matter of
law to reserve jurisdiction to award periodic alimony in the future, al-
though it may be an abuse of discretion by the trial court to do so when
the facts of a particular case call fer a reservation of jurisdiction in the
21. In re Estate of Kant, 272 So. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 1973).
22. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-5, amending FLA. STAT. § 49.011(4) (Supp. 1972).
23. Wood v. Wood, 276 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
24. Floyd v. Floyd, 281 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1973).
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event of a subsequent change in circumstances.", However, the same
district court subsequently held that it is an abuse of discretion and re-
versible error if the trial court fails to reserve jurisdiction in such cases.26
The same Third District also held that it is proper for a trial court
to award lump sum alimony payable in monthly installments over a
period of years and to reserve jurisdiction to award periodic alimony at
the conclusion of the monthly installments if it should be needed at that
time.27
An award of $1.00 per year periodic alimony has been upheld on
the basis that it is simply a reservation of jurisdiction over the issue of
periodic alimony; it is proper to deny alimony when there is a lack of
present need and to reserve jurisdiction to award alimony in the future
upon a change of circumstances. The award of a nominal amount is
apparently just another way of accomplishing the same end. 8
C. Rehabilitative Alimony
In a case of first impression under section 61.14 of the Florida
Statutes (1971) (the Dissolution of Marriage Act) the District Court of
Appeal, Third District, has held that when a trial judge reserves jurisdic-
tion over the parties and the case, he may exercise his discretion in either
(1) setting a definite date at which rehabilitative alimony should
terminate (or to set a specific date for a hearing on such matter
at a time in the future) or, (2) in falling to set such a date.
Thus, the chancellor would be reversed only for an abuse of such
discretion under the circumstances of the case then being re-
viewed.29
It has been held that it is not reversible error for a trial court
to limit an award of alimony to a period of 26 weeks, even though a
former wife seemingly showed a need for the alimony (because of physi-
cal and emotional problems) and the former husband was wealthy, when
the court retained jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter. The
ex-wife could seek modification before or after the expiration of the
26 week period.30
A former wife is not necessarily entitled to an award of alimony
which will enable her to maintain her pre-divorce standard of living.
The court may, in appropriate circumstances, award lump sum alimony
to tide her over until she can acquire sufficient training to support her-
self. The court should further retain jurisdiction to award alimony in the
future upon a proper showing by the former wife.8
25. Poe v. Poe, 263 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
26. Marshall v. Marshall, 273 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
27. Langston v. Langston, 257 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
28. Munger v. Munger, 249 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
29. Stamm v. Stamm, 266 So. 2d 413, 415 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
30. Melin v. Melin, 265 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
31. McRee v. McRee, 267 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
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Without any citation to the new Dissolution of Marriage Act, the
District Court of Appeal, First District, has held that a wife who has had
a sufficient time to rehabilitate herself and to regain her health by over-
coming her drinking problem should not receive an award of permanent
alimony.32
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has refused to disturb
an award of rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $25 per week for a
period of three months and the payment of the former wife's medical bills
by the former husband for a period of only three months. 3
When a husband was earning between $11,000 and $12,000 per
year, the wife and a young child had returned to her parents' home where
they had no living expenses, and the wife was to take training as beau-
tician at a cost of approximately $800, an award of $15 per week "reha-
bilitative alimony" was considered to be inadequate by the District Court
of Appeal, Third District, and was increased to $30 per week for a period
of one year.34
It is reversible error to award alimony for a fixed period of four years
at the rate of $85 per week for a period of two years and $40 per week
for the following two years when the spouses had been married for twenty-
three years, the wife was ill and did not possess any marketable skill. The
case was remanded with instructions to award permanent alimony in an
amount based upon her needs and her former husband's ability to pay.85
D. Defenses to an Award
In accordance with the new Dissolution of Marriage Statute, 6
the District Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that the husband's
defense of adultery by the wife is not a complete bar to an award of
alimony. Instead, the trial court has discretion to consider the circum-
stances in determining whether alimony should be awarded and the
amount thereof to the adulterous spouse. The trial court judge may in
the proper exercise of his discretion completely disregard the question
of adultery in making the award.3 7
In one of the first cases arising under the alimony provisions of the
new Dissolution of Marriage Act, 8 the District Court of Appeal, First
District, in reversing a trial court award of alimony, held that when the
property of the parties has been evenly divided between them, each of
them is able to work, and the one child of the marriage is an adult
and self-supporting, the wife is not entitled to any alimony. The court
based its decision on the view that:
32. Beard v. Beard, 262 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
33. Kirchheiner v. Kirchheiner, 278 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
34. Primato v. Primato, 274 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
35. Wilson v. Wilson, 279 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
36. FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1973).
37. Vandervoort v. Vandervoort, 265 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
38. FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1973).
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
The new concept of the marriage relation implicit in the so-
called "no fault" divorce law ... places both parties to the mar-
riage on a basis of complete equality as partners sharing equal
rights and obligations in the marriage relationship and sharing
equal burdens in the event of dissolution. 9
It is reversible error for a trial court to allow a husband to set-off
against his alimony obligations monies paid by him on account of a
business transaction between the parties in the absence of compelling
equitable considerations.4 °
In a case of first impression in Florida, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal has held that "in the absence of compelling equitable criteria
and considerations to the contrary, a husband shall not be permitted to
set-off against his alimony obligation monies paid by him on account
of a joint and several income tax liability." 4'
It is not an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to deny alimony to
a wife when the marriage was of short duration, the wife's son by a prior
marriage had stolen the husband's credit card and check book and had
committed forgeries, the wife received the couple's mobile home and the
husband was a victim of Parkinson's disease and was receiving a V.A.
pension."
E. Criteria for the Award
In a case of first impression under the Dissolution of Marriage
Act, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that since
under the former law the wife's entitlement to alimony depended upon
a showing of her need and the husband's ability to pay, now the husband's
entitlement to alimony likewise depends upon a showing of his need and
the wife's ability to pay. 3
If a husband and wife have approximately the same amount of
income, it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court judge to award
alimony of $50 per week to the wife and the exclusive use of the
jointly held former home; an alimony award in the form of the use of
the home is sufficient. 44
An award of $100 per week for approximately three months and
$75 per week thereafter for alimony and child support for one child
is proper when the facts show that the husband was drawing $200
to $300 per week from a business in which he is the one-half owner, and
he owns a 1972 Cadillac automobile and two parcels of property held
with his wife as an estate by the entirety.45
39. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583, 585 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
40. Rankin v. Rankin, 268 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
41. Chappell v. Chappell 253 So. 2d 281, 287 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971) (original emphasis).
42. Swain v. Swain, 270 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
43. Lefler v. Lefler, 264 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
44. Weston v. Weston, 251 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
45. Maroun v. Maroun, 277 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has held it to be
reversible error to award a wife $25 per week alimony (in addition to
$15,000 lump sum alimony) for a limited period to terminate when the
parties' sixteen-year-old child becomes emancipated or sooner if the wife
remarries, when the parties had been married for 23 years, the wife had
earned only three or four hundred dollars a year in recent years, she
had custody of the minor child and the husband had assets worth ap-
proximately $200,000. The court increased the award to $50 per week
and provided that the award should continue until her remarriage or
death. 6
The-primary criteria to be used in determining the amount of an
alimony award are the husband's ability to pay (which is based upon
his income as well as his capital assets) and the needs of the wife to
live in a manner reasonably commensurate with that provided by her
husband during the marriage."'
F. Allocation of Amounts
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has disapproved a
final judgment which ordered a former husband to pay numerous items
(such as gas expense, mortgage payments, camp expenses, etc.) which
collectively would consist of alimony and child support, and it ordered
the trial court to divide the amounts awarded into separate alimony and
child support payments for the benefit of the parties, the court and for
income tax reasons.4
It is reversible error to award a lump sum per week for both ali-
mony and child support; the judgment should specify amounts for each
recipient. 9
G. Lump Sum Alimony
A lump sum alimony award is not appropriate when the wife is
permanently disabled, is of advanced years and lacks income and assets.50
Although the remarriage of the wife will normally terminate her
right to continued payments of alimony, remarriage will not terminate a
lump sum alimony award even though it is payable in installments.'
If a husband continues to make payments of temporary alimony
after the wife has filed her appeal, he is entitled to offset these payments
against an award of lump sum alimony.52
46. Fligelman v. Fligelman, 272 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1973).
47. Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1972) ; Royal v. Royal, 263 So. 2d 277
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
48. Landsberg v. Landsberg, 259 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
49. Ecklund v. Ecklund, 253 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
50. Calligarich v. Calligarich, 256 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
51. Keller v. Belcher, 256 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
52. Rankin v. Rankin, 275 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
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An award of $25 per week as alimony payable for a period of four
years or until the marriage of the wife should not be construed as lump
sum alimony payable in installments, but as periodic alimony. Hence,
when the wife dies before the expiration of the four-year period the
husband's obligation to continue payments ceases.53
H. Enforcement of the Award
It is reversible error for a trial court to enter an order of civil
contempt for non-payment of alimony which provides that the offender
"(may purge himself of this contempt and be released from ... jail after
six (6) months from the date of said hearing. . . ."" In civil contempt
proceedings for non-payment of alimony the offender has the right to
purge himself of contempt at any time.
I. Modification of Alimony
Section 61.191 of the Florida Statutes (1971) clearly provides that
the Dissolution of Marriage Act applies to all proceedings commenced on
or after July 1, 1971; hence, it is error for a trial court retroactively to
apply the alimony provisions of the Dissolution Act by eliminating
permanent alimony which was awarded years before the act and awarding
rehabilitative alimony instead.55
An alimony award (which was based upon a separation agreement)
may not be modified by the trial court upon the basis of the husband's
testimony that some of his financial expectations were not achieved in the
absence of any actual substantial change in his financial condition between
the date of the award and the hearing for modification.56
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that periodic
alimony may be increased upon application by the ex-wife when the
only change of circumstance is a substantial increase in the earnings of
the former husband. Judge Barkdull, in a strong dissent, was of the view
that in light of modern concepts of divorce it is wrong to allow the wife
to apply for modification upon this sole ground at any time during the
remainder of the ex-husband's lifetime.57
Pure property settlement agreements may not be judicially modified
in Florida; however, if the agreement provides for periodic alimony for
an indefinite duration and the amount of alimony is not based upon the
wife's relinquishing her special equity in property held by the spouses
then (under section 61.14 of the Florida Statutes (1971)) the amount of
53. Morris v. Morris, 272 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
54. Williams v. Williams, 277 So. 2d 542, 543 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
55. Carmel v. Carmel, 282 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
56. Mazzula v. Mazzula, 275 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
57. Sherman v. Sherman, 279 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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alimony may be increased or decreased because of a change in the cir-
cumstances of the parties.6 8
The value of the husband's assets must be taken into consideration
by the trial court when determining change of circumstances to support
modification of an alimony award; current income is not the sole
criterion. 59
A trial court may not eliminate the husband's obligation to pay
alimony as a sanction for the wife's denial of child visitation privileges.6"
It is reversible error for a court to modify a final judgment of ali-
mony and child support upon an oral motion of the father; any modifica-
tion must be supported by a written pleading."'
It is also reversible error to terminate an alimony award upon
the husband's allegations of ill health which allegedly interfered with
his performance as a surgeon when the facts show that his gross income
had increased. Of course, if the husband's health condition should force
him to discontinue his practice or to reduce it causing an inability to
pay the awarded alimony, he may petition at that time for a reduction
or termination.62
When a wife is awarded the use and occupation of the marital
domicile held as an estate by the entirety and the husband is required
to pay one-half of the cost of maintenance, this obligation is in lieu of
alimony and the husband should be relieved from this obligation upon
the remarriage of the wife. However, the remarriage does not auto-
matically terminate the husband's obligation and the obligation will
continue until he institutes proceedings to terminate it.63
J. Duration of Liability
Normally, an award of alimony will terminate upon the death of the
husband-it will not be a charge against his estate. However, if the hus-
band consents to an award binding his estate it will be given effect. The
case of Ford v. First National Bank" concerned a final divorce decree
which provided for alimony "for the rest of her life or until she re-
marries."66 The husband did not appeal this decree, and he made pay-
ments under it for a number of years before his death. The District Court
of Appeal, Second District, held, in accordance with the teachings of
the case of Aldrich v. Aldrich,6 that when a husband does not appeal
58. Schulman v. Schulman, 273 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
59. Adams v. Adams, 273 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
60. Vance v. Vance, 274 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
61. Lourcey v. Lourcey, 256 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
62. Osman v. Osman, 280 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
63. Bernst v. Cotter, 256 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
64. 260 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
65. Id. at 877.
66. 163 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1964).
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from a decree containing this wording and he makes payments for years
he, in effect, has consented to the provision and he cannot collaterally
attack this decree which has become final. As a result, his estate remains
bound for the continued payments subsequent to his death.
It is reversible error for the trial court to limit the award of alimony
to a six month period in the absence of proof that the needs of the wife
or the ability of the husband to pay would terminate at that time."7
K. Legislation
Section 61.181 has been added to the Florida Statutes to provide for
the establishment by the chief judge of each judicial circuit of a deposi-
tory to receive and disburse all support, alimony or maintenance pay-
ments. The chief judge is empowered to impose a fee for this service
which shall not exceed three percent of the amount of the payment.",
The Supreme Court of Florida adopted this statute as an amendment to
rule 1.611 of the Florida Civil Rules of Procedure. 9
L. Miscellaneous
When a woman's second marriage has been declared void ab initio
on the grounds of bigamy and she files suit to reinstate the alimony pro-
visions contained in the divorce judgment against her first husband, it is
error for the trial court to look behind the annulment judgment to deter-
mine whether it was based upon a bigamous marriage. 70
It is reversible error for a trial court to proceed to a final hearing and
to determine questions of alimony and support without the presence of
the wife or her counsel when such absence resulted from the sudden
illness of the wife's attorney. 7'
IV. PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Jurisdiction
When a dissolution judgment has awarded the wife possession of
a jointly held motel, whose income after the payment of a mortgage,
taxes, etc. is to be used to support the wife and children, the court does
not have jurisdiction approximately one year later to award the wife a
salary for her management of the motel. If she is entitled to a salary, she
must file an independent law suit against her former husband. 72
Although it may have been erroneous and subject to reversal upon
67. Schwarb v. Schwarb, 259 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
68. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-112, creating FLA. STAT. § 61.181 (1973).
69. In re Clarification of Florida Rules of Practice and Procedure, 281 So. 2d 204 (Fla.
1973).
70. Wertheim v. Wertheim, 262 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
71. Diaz v. Diaz, 258 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
72. Serge v. Serge, 276 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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direct appeal for a trial court judge to have awarded sole possession of
the family home (owned as an estate by the entirety) to the husband,
the judgment was not subject to attack two years after its rendition under
rule 1.540 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The judgment was
not void, and its provisions are binding even though they might be con-
sidered erroneous.73
Once a trial court has adjudged that a tenancy by the entirety has
become a tenancy in common as the result of the divorce of the parties,
the court does not have jurisdiction a few years later to order that the
husband's interest be conveyed to the wife as a means of providing housing
for her and the children of the marriage.74
When a trial court judge has confirmed the findings of a special
master regarding the property rights of the parties, this judgment is res
judicata (after the expiration of the period for appeal) and the court is
without power to modify these property rights.75
A trial court does not have jurisdiction to partition real and per-
sonal property of the spouses in a divorce action when the husband's
counterclaim merely contains a simple prayer for the partition; a parti-
tion action must be supported by pleadings which will satisfy the due
process requirements of the partition statutes.76
B. Gifts
When title to property (whether real or personal) is taken in the
joint names of husband and wife, a presumption of a gift to the wife
arises, and this presumption can only be defeated by a "clear, positive
and unequivocal showing that no gift was intended. ' 77 In order to rebut
this presumption of a gift, it is necessary to prove the lack of donative
intent beyond a reasonable doubt; a mere preponderance of the evidence
is not enough. If, however, a husband should purchase property and
then later make a gift of a one-half interest to the wife, the presumption
that the husband made a gift to the wife is not conclusive and may be
rebutted by a mere preponderance of the evidence. This decision seems
to be inconsistent with the Florida Constitution which provides that
"there shall be no distinction between married women and married men
in the holding, control, disposition, or encumbering of their property,
both real and personal ."7
On the other hand, if a wife should contribute funds used in the
acquisition and improvement of real property jointly owned with her
73. Cribb v. Cribb, 261 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
74. Walborsky v. Walborsky, 258 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
75. Vandervoort v. Vandervoort, 277 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
76. Rankin v. Rankin, 258 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972), followed in Coyrendall v.
Coyren.dall, 260 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972) ; Coscia v. Coscia, 262 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1972). But see Mitchell v. Mitchell, 268 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
77. Pollak v. Pollak, 282 So. 2d 30, 32 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
78. FLA. CONST., art. X, § 5 (1968).
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husband, it is presumed that she intended to make a gift to him. If the
presumption is not rebutted by her, then the property is divided equally
between the spouses as tenants in common.7"
C. Estates by the Entirety and In Common
A divorce decree which provides that "[t]he home is to be owned
jointly between the plaintiff and the defendant,"8 creates a tenancy in
common between the parties.
In order for there to be a valid joint tenancy in either personal or
real property the four unities of possession, interest, title and time must
be present.8'
The legend in a deed which states, "Note Pursuant to Section
689.15 Florida Statutes (F.S.A.), provision is hereby and in this instru-
ment expressly made for the right of the survivorship between the
grantees''82 is sufficient to create a joint tenancy with right of survivor-
ship in the grantees.
A cotenant (former husband) who is in possession of property held
as a tenancy in common with his former wife is not liable or accountable
to her for the use value of the premises, unless he holds adversely to her
in the sense that he has refused her the right to enjoy possession as a
tenant in common. 83
It is reversible error for a trial court to order the wife to convey to
her husband all of her interest in property held by the spouses as an
estate by the entirety in the absence of an agreement between the parties
providing for this division or in the absence of proper pleadings showing
some special equity of the husband in the property.84
In the absence of any reason found in the record, it is an abuse of
discretion for the trial court judge to order a husband to pay off the
mortgage on a marital home within 90 days in the absence of any facts
in the record which show that the husband could not continue to make
the mortgage payments in monthly installments.85
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that a
conveyance of a tenancy by the entirety in realty by a husband and wife
to the husband by means of a common form warranty deed which
purports to also convey "dower and right of dower"86 does not divest
79. Davis v. Davis, 282 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
80. Englebright v. Englebright, 275 So. 2d 287, 288 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973) (emphasis
deleted).
81. La Pierre v. Kalergis, 257 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1972), folowing First Nat'l Bank v.
Hector Supply Co., 254 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1971).
82. La Pierre v. Kalergis, 251 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
83. Seeholts v. Beers, 270 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
84. Harder v. Harder, 264 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); accord, Sharpe v. Sharpe,
267 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972) ; Kamensky v..Kamensky, 282 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1973).
85. King v. King, 271 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
86. In re Estate of Hiley, 262 So. 2d 476, 478 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
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the wife of her right of dower in the property when her husband pre-
deceases her. The court was careful to note that there could, of course,
be a release of dower by a wife to her husband but it must "be clearly
and unequivocally accomplished" 8 7 by something other than a common
form warranty deed.
In Toby v. Toby88 a husband and wife had a joint savings account
in the amount of $15,000. The husband admitted that the money be-
longed to both of them. Subsequently, the funds were withdrawn and
used to form a corporation and to purchase its corporate stock, with 99
shares going to the husband and one share to the wife. Subsequently,
the marriage was dissolved and the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, held that the wife was not entitled to one-half of the corporate
stock. She did not work for the corporation, nor did she contribute any
monies except the initial investment and, consequently, she was entitled
only to her initial one-half of the account, $7,500, with interest.
In a case arising under the Florida Constitution of 1885, it has
been held that a husband may convey homestead property to himself
and his wife (or through a straw man) as an estate by the entirety if
the conveyance is supported by valid consideration, which includes a
promise of marriage by a woman to the transferor, and the conveyance
is not a device to circumvent the homestead rights of children by the
first marriage of the husband. 9
D. Special Equities Doctrine
A court may adjudicate a special equity in favor of the wife in
real property which is merely described by the street address, rather
than by a legal description, when there is no confusion between the spouses
as to which property is involved."
A trial court judgment which awards the family home to the wife
without clearly specifying that it is because she has a special equity in
it or that it is awarded upon the basis of alimony may be upheld by an
appellate court when the record shows that the award is supported by both
reasons." On the other hand, the same district court has held that in
order for a wife to claim a special equity in the family home, it is in-
cumbent upon her to prove it to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt by
tracing her funds into the acquisition of the home or its furnishings. 2
In a somewhat confused opinion, the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, has held that when a wife claims a special equity in property
the court has jurisdiction to continue the case subsequent to the entry
87. Id. at 479.
88. 280 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
89. Camblin v. Miller, 280 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
90. Baker v. Baker, 271 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
91. Barbosa v. Barbosa, 249 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
92. Singer v. Singer, 262 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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of a divorce decree to determine the special equity issue. This is particu-
larly true when the husband's counsel has urged this conduct, the wife's
counsel has agreed and the trial court has acted accordingly. 3
In a decision which seemingly has gone beyond the facts of the case,
the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that a husband and
wife are equal partners and, as a result, when property is held as an
estate by the entirety by the couple it should be presumed that the prop-
erty was acquired by their joint efforts. Further, a jointly held domicile
ought to be divided equally between each partner with the wife's and the
husband's financial contribution to the acquisition of such property to
be considered as gifts to each other. A financial contribution by the
wife should be interpreted as being within the realm of "ordinary marital
duties"94 or a prima facie presumption of a gift. To establish a special
equity, the wife's contributions must be shown to have been "above and
beyond the performance of ordinary marital duties."95
In a relatively unusual case, it has been held that when a wife
dominated the financial affairs in her family, advanced sums of money
to the husband during coverture, and the husband had a "free ride"
during the marriage, the wife was not entitled to a money judgment for
the sums of money advanced to him.96 The decision was based upon the
idea that to award a judgment in this setting would tend to destroy the
unity concept of marriage and to violate the rule that financial contri-
butions between the spouses should be presumed to be gifts rather than
loans.
On the other hand, when the spouses have saved money which has
been deposited in joint savings accounts during coverture, each of them
is entitled to a one-half interest in these accounts upon dissolution of
the marriage."
When a judgment has been entered against the husband awarding
his wife a special equity of a one-half interest in corporate stock held
by the husband, if he appeals the award and obtains a stay of the pro-
ceeding without a bond, he is not liable for a substantial loss in value
caused by a decline in the stock market during the pendency of the ap-
peal.9 8
E. Insurance
It is reversible error for a trial court to order a husband in a dis-
solution action to maintain an insurance policy on his life for the benefit
of his former wife and to make her an irrevocable beneficiary.9
93. Farr v. Farr, 249 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). The court stated that the case of
Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, 235 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) was distinguishable on the facts,
"and if it is not so distinguishable then this opinion will be in conflict therewith." Id. at 762.
94. Steinhauer v. Steinhauer, 252 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
95. id. at 830.
96. Rey v. Rey, 279 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
97. Shannon v. Shannon, 279 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
98. Green v. Green, 254 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
99. Moses v. Moses, 279 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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F. Constructive Trusts
It may be proper for a trial court to impose a constructive trust
in favor of the wife as a joint owner of the marital home when the
husband and wife borrowed the downpayment for the purchase of the
home from the wife's grandmother and the wife had the understanding
that she was to have an interest in the property but the husband took title
in his name alone.100
G. Fraudulent Transactions
In a divorce proceeding the trial court judge has the power and the
rightful discretion to order a husband to repurchase shares of stock
which he had sold to his wife by means of fraud one and one-half years
prior to their marriage and when he further defrauded her by the
manner in which he conducted the corporate affairs during the 17 days
they lived together as husband and wife.''
A husband who has conveyed real property to his wife for the purpose
of hindering or defrauding his creditors has no standing in a court of
equity to recover the property from the grantee-wife. 0 2 However, the
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that when a wife
fraudulently acquires virtually all of her husband's property and then
subsequently conveys it to her lover as a result of his fraud and of her
desire to protect the property from the reach of her husband's divorce
action, the wife may recover the property from the lover on the theory
that she was less guilty of wrongdoing than her lover was.' 03
H. Miscellaneous
A judgment for arrearages in alimony which was recorded prior to
the time that a former husband acquired a homestead with a new wife
may be enforced by execution against the homestead."°
I. Legislation
At long last, the Florida Legislature has decided to give men equal
rights with women by legislating that either spouse has the right to elect
to take a one-third dower interest in all the real and personal property
left by a deceased spouse at the time of his or her death. In addition,
the enactment eliminates dower of any widow whose husband died prior
to the effective date of the Act (October 1, 1973) in any property sold by
the husband without the joinder of the wife unless she files a claim within
three years after his death." 5
100. Genter v. Genter, 270 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
101. Truxell v. Truxell, 259 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
102. Studdle v. Studdle, 267 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
103. Schetter v. Schetter, 279 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
104. Kirkland v. Kirkland, 253 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
105. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-107, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 731.34, .35(1)-(3), .36,
733.09, .10, .11, .13 and 734.14 (1971).
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The Florida Gift to Minors Act was amended to provide for testa-
mentary gifts and gifts in trust of securities, money or life insurance
policies or annuities to minors and, to establish procedures whereby the
legal representative or trustee may distribute these items to the legal
custodian. 06
An equal rights statute which prohibits any discrimination based
on sex, marital status or race in the areas of loaning money, granting
credit, or equal pay for services performed has been enacted. The victim
of any discrimination under this act may bring a civil action, and he or
she shall be entitled to collect not only compensatory damages but also
punitive damages and reasonable attorney fees.0 7
V. ATTORNEY'S FEES
A. Jurisdiction
When a court enters a default judgment against a husband in a
dissolution of marriage case and subsequently grants the dissolution and
awards attorney's fees, the court does not have power, eleven months
later, to vacate the award of attorney's fees upon the basis that the court
originally lacked jurisdiction to do so because the former husband had
allegedly divorced the wife (without her knowledge) prior to her suit
against the husband. 0 8
Chapter 73-84 of the Florida Statutes provides that when motions
are filed in the appellate courts for awards of attorneys' fees for services
in such courts, the courts are to remand the motions to the trial court for
assessment of the fees. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has
held that this statute is unconstitutional because section 2 (a) of article
V of the Florida Constitution provides that only the Supreme Court of
Florida has the power to adopt rules of practice and procedure in all
courts. The Legislature has the power to repeal a court-created rule of
practice, but it does not have the power to adopt a rule of practice. As
a result, the appellate courts have jurisdiction to award attorney's fees.'0 9
B. Appeals
Section 733.19 of the Florida Statutes (1971) prohibits levy of
execution of judgment against the estate of a deceased which was obtained
prior to the death of the deceased. Consequently, it is reversible error for
a trial court judge to order the posting of a supersedeas bond as a con-
dition to appeal from an order awarding attorney's fees in a dissolution
of marriage action which was entered prior to the death of the deceased."
106. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-202, amending FLA. STAT. § 710.03 (1971).
107. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-251.
108. West v. West, 269 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
109. Carmel v. Carmel, 282 So. 2d (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
110. Donner v. Donner, 276 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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When a dissolution of marriage case is appealed and the appealing
wife does not ask the appellate court to award attorney's fees for the
appeal, and if the appellate court does not fix or refer to attorney's fees
in the decision or mandate, the trial court upon remand of the case will
not have the power to award attorney's fees for the appeal."'
Inasmuch as the Dissolution of Marriage Act provides that an
attorney may enforce an award of attorney's fees in his name," 2 it would
appear that the very recent case of Simkins v. Simkins" 3 has been ef-
fectively overruled. Simkins held that since an attorney for whose bene-
fit a fee is allowed is not a party to a divorce case he may not appeal
therefrom and is not entitled to move in his own name for a rehearing
or to file other post-trial motions for reconsideration of the order making
the fee award. Further, when he does file a post-trial motion it does not
operate to toll or extend the period for appeal.
C. Rights to an Award
Even though a trial court may be correct in refusing to award
alimony to a wife because she has assets which produce income sufficient
to support her in accordance with her former standard of living, it may
be reversible error to refuse to order her husband to pay her attorney's
fees. "[T]he discretion of the court should not have been exercised to
require the [wife] to pay her attorneys out of the monies or assets which
the court found were [bases] for denying her application for alimony.""' 4
A court does not have the power to order that in the event of any
subsequent proceedings dealing with the modification of child support
payments, each of the parties would be responsible for his or her own
attorney's fees; this issue must be decided when and if it is raised in
the future." 5
Under former section 61.15(1) of the Florida Statutes (1969), it
has been held that a wife may be awarded attorney's fees in the appellate
court for litigation dealing with her execution of an alimony judgment
against the property of her former husband."'
D. Amount
The Supreme Court of Florida has upheld an attorney's fee award of
"slightly over $100 per hour for legal services 1" 7 (the fee was $85,000)
111. Fatolitis v. Fatolitis, 271 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
112. FLA. STAT. § 61.16 (1973),
113. 249 So. 2d 444 (Fla, 3d Dist. 1971).
114. Nadeau v. Nadeau, 259 So. 2d 541, 542 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
115. Griffin v. Griffin, 276 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
116. Kirkland v. Kirkland, 253 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
117. Bosem v. Bosem, 279 So. 2d 863, 866 (Fla. 1973), rev'g 269 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1972), wherein the district court had frowned upon an award of attorney's fees based
upon an hourly rate of $101.70 for a total award of $85,000 and reduced the award to
$45,000, which amounted to approximately $50.00 per hour. Unfortunately for the wife's
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in a "complex and demanding"" 8 dissolution of marriage case involving
a husband who was worth over $2,210,000 with an annual income of over
$100,000.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has reduced an at-
torney's fee award of $85,000 to $50,000 in a case involving from 175
to 200 hours of legal work spent primarily in investigating the amount
of the husband's wealth. The wife received lump sum alimony of
$427,000 and a promise of an additional $1,000,000 if she survived him;
however, the actual negotiation of the settlement was made by the wife
and the husband without the direct intervention of the wife's attorneys.
The court seemed to stress the fact that an award of fees which amounted
to $425 per hour for all of the work (irrespective of the kind of work
done) was excessive. It is submitted that the reduced award amounts to
a fee of $250 per hour and that this is also excessive if judged solely
on an hourly basis. It is also submitted that the court erred in stressing
the hourly rate of compensation over other considerations. Judge Henry,
in dissent, pointed out that the fee should be measured by the results ob-
tained, etc; the amount of time devoted is merely one factor to be used."'
It is unfortunate that both the majority and dissenting opinions turned
on the Third District's decision in Bosem v. Bosem 120 because it was
reversed by the Supreme Court of Florida.
A trial court's award of attorney's fees to the wife will not be
upset when the amount is considerably less than the amount stated by
expert witnesses, the husband produced no testimony that the amount
was excessive, and a large amount of the time devoted by the lawyers for
the wife was directly attributable to the "husband's recalcitrance and
evasiveness."121
E. Enforcement
Contempt proceedings are available to enforce payment of attorney's
fees which were awarded to a wife in a divorce judgment pursuant to
an agreement between the parties which stipulated as to the amount of the
fees. 22
attorneys, she had revealed upon deposition that she had agreed to pay her attorneys $50.00
per hour for out of court work and $75.00 per hour for court work and the court was
obviously affected by this fact. See Lodding v. Dunn, 251 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971),
which affirmed an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $75,000 from a wife and
$25,000 from the husband based upon a quantum meruit basis when the lawyers worked
approximately 600 hours and the property involved was worth approximately $500,000.
118. Bosem v. Bosem, 279 So. 2d 863, 866 (Fla. 1973).
119. Donner v. Donner, 281 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
120. See note 117 supra.
121. Lee v. Lee, 262 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
122. Heitzman v. Heitzman, 281 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1973).
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VI. ANTENUPTIAL AND POST-NUPTIAL PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
A. Antenuptial Agreements
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that a husband cannot in
an antenuptial agreement disclaim liability for alimony, suit money and
attorney's fees in a suit brought for alimony unconnected with dissolution
under section 61.09 of the Florida Statutes (1969). The husband in an
antenuptial agreement can disclaim liability for these items after dis-
solution of the marriage, but while the marriage continues (even though
the parties are separated) he remains liable in spite of the agreement.'23
It is submitted that this decision makes no sense whatsoever. As Justice
Carlton stated in a rather stinging dissent:
Being unable to find any rational distinction between a validly
entered into antenuptial agreement waiving alimony subsequent
to marriage which agreements have been upheld by this Court,
and a validly entered into agreement which contains a paragraph
providing for waiver of alimony before consummation of disso-
lution of the marriage, I must respectfully dissent. 24
The validity of an antenuptial agreement is presumed as a matter
of law. Hence when it provides that the wife disclaims any interest in the
estate of her husband and this agreement is introduced in the probate
court as a purported bar to the allowance of a family allowance and
election of dower, the county judge must give effect to this agreement.
The burden of proving the invalidity of the agreement rests upon the
party who so charges to bring separate proceedings in the circuit court.
It should be noted that even though the county judge must give effect to
the agreement (unless it is invalidated in the circuit court), he may still
award a family allowance prior to a determination of the legal effect of
the agreement, and perhaps continue it during the pendency of circuit
court proceedings.' 25
The case of Posner v. Posner'26 has made its second appearance127
123. Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1972), rev'g 256 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1972), which held that an antenuptial agreement which gives substantial consideration to a
wife in return for her waiving all claims to alimony, suit money or other maintenance is
not contrary to public policy and it will be effective to preclude the wife from recovering
alimony unconnected with divorce under former section 61.09 of the Florida Statutes (1969).
124. Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So. 2d 7, 18 (Fla. 1972).
125. In re Estate of Macarell, 254 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). See Benke v. Benke,
254 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), for a lengthy antenuptial agreement which completely
covered the parties' property interests in the event of death but which failed to cover the
question of alimony in the event of death.
126. Posner v. Posner, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972).
127. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970), rev'g 206 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1968). See also Posner v. Posner, 237 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), and Posner v. Posner,
245 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
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in the Supreme Court of Florida, and the court has held that the failure
of the husband to disclose to his wife that he had the right to receive
distribution from a trust corpus of $8,400,000 and the fact that the
antenuptial agreement failed to make adequate provision for her in light
of this trust renders the agreement void.
B. Post-Nuptial Agreements
When a separation agreement was never introduced into evidence in
a North Carolina suit for divorce and it was not referred to, ratified, con-
firmed nor made a part of the final judgment of divorce, the separation
agreement was not, therefore, incorporated in the North Carolina judg-
ment and was not entitled to full faith and credit in Florida. However,
the foreign separation agreement could be sued upon in Florida as a
contract right which entitles the former wife to monthly support pay-
ments. Further, under section 61.14 of the Florida Statutes (1971) the
husband could counterclaim for modification of the agreement because of
a change of the financial circumstances of the parties since the agreement
was executed. 28
If a separation agreement provides that child support payments
shall decrease in the event of the remarriage of the wife and the wife
does marry another, then the liability of the father will automatically be
reduced without the necessity of the father instituting modification pro-
ceedings. 29
A court has the power to modify a clause in a property settlement
agreement (which was approved by a divorce decree) which provided for
alimony of $250 per month for a period of four years with the husband
having the right to pay "in a lump sum the entire balance due, rather
than making periodic payments over a four year period"'30 upon the
basis that this alimony was neither a lump sum award nor was it a
sum to be paid in return for the wife's conveying her interest in property
to the husband.
A trial court is not bound by the alimony provisions of a separation
agreement and may in the judgment of dissolution of marriage decrease
the amounts specified in the agreement.'
A property settlement agreement (which was made part of a divorce
decree) provided that if the husband should die before the wife, the
estate of the husband would "be chargeable only with five years support
and maintenance for said defendant wife from the date of any Order
of Court or decree that may be entered in this cause."'82 The District
Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the wife was entitled to
128. Martin v. Martin, 261 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
129. Mendel v. Mendel, 257 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
130. Paras v. Paras, 262 So. 2d 203, 205 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
131. Risteen v. Risteen, 280 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
132. Graham v. Graham, 277 So. 2d 540, 541-42 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973) (original emphasis).
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support for a period of five years after the date of the divorce decree,
not for a period of five years after his death.
VII. SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
Separate maintenance has not been abolished by the new Dissolution
of Marriage Act, and it may be awarded even though it may be categorized
by another designation by the trial court. 133 It was reversible error to
award alimony unconnected with divorce under former section 61.09 of
the Florida Statutes (1969) in the absence of written pleadings asking
for this remedy and in the absence of any proof that the husband had
the ability to furnish support and was failing to do so.' 4
A court cannot adjudicate property rights in real estate in a suit for
separate maintenance.1 85
VIII. CUSTODY AND SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
A. Custody
In an incredibly complex case, the Supreme Court of Florida has
held that a nonresident father who has come to Florida to obtain custody
of his child pursuant to a Florida habeas corpus order (which afforded
full faith and credit to a previous North Carolina custody order) was
immune from service of process in habeas corpus proceedings. These pro-
ceedings were instituted by the former wife on the day he came to
Florida, and he returned to North Carolina and failed to abide by the
decision of the Florida court which awarded custody of the child to its
mother. Since he was immune, he could not be held in contempt of court
for his failure to abide by the custody order.136
1. CONFLICTS OF LAW
A custody decree of a foreign state is not entitled to full faith and
credit in Florida because it is subject to modification as the interests of
the children may require in the event of a change in circumstances; how-
ever, the decree is entitled to great weight and respect in Florida in the
absence of clear and convincing proof of a change in circumstances since
the rendition of the decree.8 7
2. CRITERIA FOR THE AWARD
It would appear that the District Court of Appeal, First District,
has broken with prior case law by upholding a trial court award of
133. Nooe v. Nooe, 277 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
134. Neel v. Neel, 255 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
135. Lamers v. Lamers, 277 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
136. Crane v. Hayes, 253 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1971).
137. Schmidt v. Reyes, 274 So. 2d 242 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1973); accord, Krasnosky v.
Krasnosky, 282 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973); Powell v. Powell, 274 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1973); Scarpetta v. DeMartino, 254 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
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custody of three boys, ages six, eight and ten, to the father even though
the mother was found to be a fit parent. The court stated that when
both parents are equally fit to have custody, normally custody of young
children will be awarded to the mother. However, in this case the father
was an unusually devoted parent, and the court obviously felt that this
devotion tipped the scales in his favor.18 The result of this case is con-
sistent with section 61.13(2) of the Dissolution of Marriage Act which
provides that "upon considering all relevant factors, the father of the child
shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining
custody."
Similarly, it is within the sound judicial discretion of the trial court
judge to award custody of a minor child to the father when the evidence
shows that it would be in the best interests of the child that he remain
with the father. 8 '
Adulterous behavior of the wife is not sufficient in itself to deprive
her from having custody of her minor children; she may be a good
mother in spite of being a bad wife.140 This view was reiterated by the
Supreme Court of Florida which held, however, that when the adulterous
relationship involves more than a casual adulterous rendezvous and
the wife was living with the man in the same house with the children,
the paramour physically disciplining them and giving vent to outbursts
when the natural father visited his children, a trial court judge would be
justified in changing custody from the mother and awarding it to the
father.14 '
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that it is
reversible error for a trial court to decide the questions of child custody
and support without the testimony of the mother even though a default
judgment had been entered against her. The case was remanded for the
purpose of taking further testimony bearing upon these two issues. 42
3. MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY
It is an abuse of discretion for the trial court judge to refuse to
restore full-time custody of a child to her parents when they have made
a strong showing of fitness and there was no evidence to contradict their
evidence. The fact that the parents had previously lost custody because
the child had suffered injuries of an undetermined origin and the judge
138. Brust v. Brust, 266 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). In a pre-Dissolution of Mar-
riage Act case, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that in child custody cases
the natural parents are preferred over other relatives and third persons, and, other things
being equal, the welfare of the minor child is best served by awarding custody to the mother.
Howard v. Howard, 259 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
139. Cardillo v. Cardillo, 269 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
140. Farrow v. Farrow, 263 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
141. Smothers v. Smothers, 281 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1973), discharging cert. in 257 So. 2d
591 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
142. Doane v. Doane, 279 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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was concerned that the child might be mistreated by her parents is not
enough in light of the parents' uncontradicted showing of fitness.143
The expressed desire of a child to live with one parent or the other
is entitled to weight during custody proceedings, and the degree of weight
depends upon the circumstances of the case. When six or seven years
have elapsed between the original award of custody and the. proceeding
brought to change custody and the child has matured to high school age
of fifteen or sixteen, his expressed desires should be given great weight."
It is the view of another court, however, that the desires of a child
to live with one parent rather than the other is only one factor to consider
in custody modification proceedings, and the rights of the parent will not
be disregarded in order to satisfy the child.145
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that it is
not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award custody of two
children ages fourteen and twelve to their stepmother when they had
been in the custody of their natural father for ten years and they expressed
a desire to remain with the stepmother after the death of the father. It
is to be noted that the natural mother strenuously contested the award of
custody to the stepmother, and the court admitted that the trial court
judge could have awarded custody to either the natural mother or the
stepmother and there would not have been a clear showing of an abuse
of discretion.' 46 When the welfare of a child has been adversely affected
by the vengeful attitude of the mother (who has custody) towards the
father and there is evidence that the development of the child has
not been wholesome while in the custody of the mother, a sufficient change
of circumstances has been shown to justify a change of custody from the
mother to the father. 7
A judgment of a juvenile court which permanently committed a
child to a state agency is not subject to collateral attack by the child's
mother who sought to regain custody through a habeas corpus action.'48
4. VISITATION RIGHTS
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has approved a final
judgment which provided that a husband could not visit his daughters
(who were in the custody of the mother) without the mother's consent and
which also forbade the mother from visiting her sons (who were in the
custody of the father) except with his consent because of the degree of
animosity existing between the ex-spouses. 49
143. In re G.M., 270 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
144. Goldstein v. Goldstein, 264 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
145. Wilson v. Condra, 255 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
146. Heffernan v. Goldman, 256 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
147. Stewart v. Stewart, 261 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
148. State ex rel. Young v. Florida State Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 254
So. 2d 374 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
149. Walborsky v. Walborsky, 258 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
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B. Support
1. JURISDICTION
A Florida court has no jurisdiction to award child support to the
wife when the husband, a resident of Alabama, has never resided in
Florida and has no property in Florida.'
2. CRITERIA FOR THE AWARD
Under the former divorce statutes the financial wealth of the wife
was not relevant evidence in fixing the amount of child support.""1 The
new Dissolution of Marriage Act provides that a change in amount of
child support may be made in the event of a change of circumstances of
either party. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, has held that
in proceedings brought under the Act to modify a child support award
which was made under the divorce statutes, the wealth of the wife at the
time of the original divorce is relevant.'
It is reversible error for the trial court to exclude testimony (on the
grounds of immateriality) dealing with the mental and physical capacity
of a 26 year old daughter before and after she reached her majority,
the facts of her marriage which was subsequently annulled and her em-
ployment with her father prior to her adjudication of incompetency,
when the court was to adjudicate the father's responsibility for her support
after she reached her majority.15
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that when
a man married a woman who was pregnant as the result of intercourse
with another man and the child was born after wedlock, the husband
was not liable for child support even though he had represented to the
world that the child was his and had supported him for three months
until the parties separated. Section 731.29 of the Florida Statutes (1971),
which provides that a man may acknowledge an illegitimate child in
writing as his child, would have no application because the statute was
intended to cover the natural father, not the husband in this case who
was not the natural father. Judge Walden, in a very strong dissent, was of
the view that the marriage deprived the mother of her cause of action
for bastardy against the natural father, and, therefore, the man who
married her should be liable for the support of the child.'"
It is reversible error for a trial court to order the husband to pay
all reasonable electrical bills, gas and fuel oil bills, water, sewage, garbage
and telephone bills incurred in the maintenance of the home for the wife
and children, and to pay all reasonable and necessary medical, dental and
150. Carnes v. Carnes, 256 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
151. Cheves v. Cheves, 269 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
152. Id.
153. Lasky v. Golden, 265 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
154. Taylor v. Taylor, 279 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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other health charges incurred by or on behalf of the minor children
of the parties. Insofar as the requirement to pay all reasonable utility
bills, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, was of the view that
this made the former wife "the final arbiter of the [husband's] economic
fate." 5 The court was also of the view that the provisions calling for
payment of all reasonable medical bills obviated part of the basis for
granting specific child support payments. The case was remanded with
instructions for the trial court to place some definable limits on these
provisions.
The Supreme Court of Florida has finally held that a trial court in
a dissolution of marriage action has the power to order a husband to
maintain a life insurance policy on his life payable to his minor children
until they reach majority or are emancipated. The court was of the view
that former section 61.13 of the Florida Statutes (1969) was broad enough
to support this result."5 6 Similarly, the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, had previously held that a trial court may require a divorced
father to maintain insurance on his life as security for the payment of
maintenance and support awarded his minor children. The father may
later seek modification of such an award when any of the children become
an adult or become self-supporting.'57
3. ENFORCEMENT OF THE AWARD
In proceedings brought in Florida to collect arrearages which have
accrued under the provisions of a foreign decree, a Florida court may
consider equitable defenses such as a subsequent modification between
the parties and the fact that the plaintiff (the former wife) has received
the greater part of the proceeds of the property of the parties.'58
When a wife brings suit to collect arrearages in child support which
accrued under a divorce judgment, it is reversible error for the trial judge
to strike the husband's affirmative defenses that the former wife had
abandoned the children for a number of years without giving him an
opportunity to introduce his evidence for a judicial evaluation. The court
noted that the former wife's right to the arrearages might have become
vested and the husband might not have any defense; however, there might
be extraordinary facts involving such defenses as estoppel or laches which
might constitute a defense. The adjudication by striking the defense was
premature. 59
When a father has agreed in a property settlement agreement to pay
the college expenses of a child and this agreement has been incorporated
155. Sapp v. Sapp, 275 So. 2d 43, 45 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
156. Bosem v. Bosem, 279 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1973), rev'g 269 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1972).
157. Harloff v. Harloff, 279 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
158. Stokes v. Crews, 265 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
159. Hurst v. Hampton, 274 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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in the dissolution judgment, it may be enforced even after the child
reaches his majority. After the child reaches his majority, however, a
court may not use a contempt order as a means of enforcing the collection
of accrued payments. 160
An interesting aspect of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act' 61 was involved in Cochran v. Cochran.62 A Florida court
as part of a divorce action entered a child support provision which
required the father to pay support "so long as visitation rights ...are
complied with."'" 3 The mother failed to comply with the visitation rights
as provided for, and the court subsequently relieved the father of his
obligation until the former wife complied. The former wife, who had
become a Pennsylvania resident, brought proceedings in that state under
the Support Act. The Florida court' then dismissed the proceedings
brought in Florida under the Act upon the basis that the Florida court
had reserved jurisdiction to insure that its judgment would be complied
with and that the proceedings brought under the Act were brought with
unclean hands and in contempt of the Florida court.
4. MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT AWARD
a. Jurisdiction
A Florida court has no power to modify vested unpaid amounts due
under a child support award,6 and any restrictions cannot predate
the date of the filing of the petition for modification.' An order increas-
ing the amount of child support ought to be effective from the date of
the filing of the petition for modification when the evidence shows that
the children had an increased need at the date of filing.'66
An Ohio judgment which orders a former husband to pay arrearages
of support which had originally been ordered by an Alabama decree is
entitled to full faith and credit in Florida even though the Ohio court may
have possibly made an error in interpreting the Alabama decree. The
parties appeared in both foreign actions and the Ohio court had juris-
diction. 67
A Florida court has power to modify child support provisions of a
separation agreement (subsequently approved in a divorce judgment)
even though the agreement was signed in New York and even though it
provided that the agreement could not be modified without the written
consent of the parties.'
160. Gersten v. Gersten, 281 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
161. Fla. Stat. ch. 88 (1971).
162. 263 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
163. Id. at 293.
164. Petrucci v. Petrucci, 252 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
165. Hynes v. Hynes, 277 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
166. Meltzer v. Meltzer, 262 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
167. Taylor v. Taylor, 258 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
168. Lang v. Lang, 252 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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In the event that parties are divorced in a foreign state and the wife
continues to reside in that foreign state, a suit to modify the foreign
judgment by reducing the amount of child support cannot be maintained
against the foreign wife by service of process by publication. If the
parties were divorced in Florida a modification proceeding could be
maintained, and service of process could be effectuated by publication
even if the wife remains a resident of a foreign state. The key is, of
course, that if the modification proceeding is ancillary to a prior Florida
dissolution action, then Florida has continuing jurisdiction. Conversely,
if the dissolution proceeding took place in a foreign state then any modifi-
cation proceeding in Florida is completely separate and independent of
the prior action and jurisdiction must be obtained by personal service
in Florida."0 9
A motion to modify a child custody judgment which is filed in the
trial court while an appeal from the same judgment is pending in an
appellate court is premature, and the trial court should dismiss it upon
this ground."'
b. Criteria for Modification
In proceedings for modification of a child support award, a wife
presents a prima facie case when she shows that the former husband's
salary has almost doubled in the preceding seven year period and that the
needs of the children have increased substantially since the original
award.
Child support payments may be increased subsequently when
"found to be necessary by the court for the best interests of the child or
children, ' or when there has been a substantial change in the circum-
stances of the parties. The court can use the "best interests" standard and
increase the amounts even when there has not been a change in the
circumstances of the parties.1
73
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, apparently upheld
a trial court's refusal to modify an award of child support even though
the father's decrease in income resulted in his paying 71 percent of his
income for the support of one child. 74
It is reversible error for the trial court judge in child custody
proceedings instituted subsequent to divorce to modify the amount of
child support payments when this issue was not raised in the pleadings
nor tried by the parties during the proceedings. 75
169. Zuccarello v. Zuccarello, 280 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
170. Brust v. Brust, 275 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
171. Banks v. Graham, 252 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
172. Wood v. Wood, 272 So. 2d 14, 14 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), construing FLA. STAT.
I 61.13(1) (1971).
173. Id.
174. Sadlowski v. Sadlowski, 254 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
175. Williams v. Williams, 272 So. 2d 827 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1973).
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It is not proper for a trial court to modify a provision for child
support based upon the former wife's suspicion that her former husband
might leave the United States when he retired; modification must be
made upon changed facts, not suspicions.' 76
Although a stepfather may not have any legal duty to support his
stepchildren, his income and financial status are material and relevant
to his wife's ability to contribute to the support of her children when the
former husband seeks to elicit this evidence when he brings proceedings
to modify a prior support award, and it is reversible error for the
trial court to refuse to allow the former husband to make inquiry into
these matters.17
5. LEGISLATION
Persons eighteen years of age now have the rights, privileges, and
obligations of all persons twenty-one years of age, except as otherwise
precluded by the Constitution of the State of Florida. However, courts
may still require support for a dependent person beyond the age of
eighteen, and this change in the law shall not affect the rights and obli-
gations existing prior to the effective date of the act. For example, child
support orders entered before the act became effective (July 1, 1973)
would not be affected.1
78
IX. ADOPTION
A. Adoption Proceedings
In a four to three opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida has held
that Florida Statute sections 49.011 (10) and 49.10 (1973) which provide
for the publication of notice to a natural mother in adoption proceedings
are unconstitutional when applied to indigent adopting parents under the
due process and equal protection provisions of the State and Federal
Constitutions, and the state should be required to pay the costs of
publication. 179 The decision was based upon the rationale of Boddie v.
Connecticut'8 which held that it was a deprivation of due 'process for
a state to deny indigents access to its courts solely because of their
inability to pay court costs in order to secure divorces. Boddie was
based upon the idea that the state has exclusive jurisdiction over
divorce which is the only method of altering a fundamental human rela-
tionship, and the Florida court was of the view that adoption should
be treated as a like area wherein the state has sole jurisdiction over alter-
ing a fundamental human relationship.
176. Lamar v. Lamar, 266 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
177. Birge v. Simpson, 280 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
178. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-21, creating FLA. STAT. § 1.01(14) (1973).
179. Grissom v. Dade County, 293 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1974), rev'g 279 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1973).
180. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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Section 63.151 of the Florida Statutes (1971) provides that after the
adoption of a child, its natural parents are "divested of all rights with
respect to the child." In light of this statute, the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, has held that when maternal grandparents adopt their
granddaughter over the strenuous contest of the natural father, the trial
court may not grant rights of visitation to the father. Of course, the
adopting parents may voluntarily consent to visits by the father.' 81
A finding of the father's laxity in supporting his child may not be
sufficient to support a finding of abandonment by him so as to make the
child a subject for adoption. 82
When a natural mother gives her written consent for the adoption of
her child the Florida Statute requires that the consent be executed in the
presence of two witnesses and be acknowledged. This statutory require-
ment is not met when the testimony indicates that a written consent was
signed in the presence of neither of the two subscribing witnesses and the
acknowledgment was forged; a decree of adoption based upon this
invalid consent must be set aside. 88
Section 63.081(3) of the Florida Statutes (1971) provides that
the written consent of any adoptee-child twelve years of age or older
shall be required in adoption proceedings. The District Court of Appeal,
Second District, has held that the primary purpose of this provision is
to insure that all interested parties are given notice of the proposed
adoption, and when the child in his testimony in open court consents to
his adoption, the failure to follow the statute does not constitute re-
versible error.8
In an apparent case of first impression in Florida, it has been held
that when the trial court refuses to decree the adoption of a child by
his stepfather it is not permissible to change the surname of the child
to that of the stepfather. 8 5
B. Legislation
Under an amendment to section 731.30 of the Florida Statutes
(1971), an adopted child is now to be considered "as the natural issue
of his adopting parents and shall inherit from and through his adopting
parents.'
86
The adoption laws of Florida have been completely revamped to
provide, among other things, for all placements of minors for adoptions
to be reported to the Division of Family Services of the Department of
181. Jones v. Allen, 277 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
182. Wiedeman v. Mickel, 269 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972); accord, In re Adoption
of Gossett, 277 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
183. Pole v. Bowen, 269 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972), construing FLA. STAT. § 63.081
(1971).
184. Carlson v. Keene, 282 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
185. Arnett v. Matthews, 259 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
186. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-43, amending FLA. STATS. § 731.30 (1971).
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Health and Rehabilitative Services; for an investigation and a recom-
mendation concerning the home in which the minor has been placed; the
complete procedure required in adoption proceedings, and the effect of
adoption which terminates all legal relationship between the adopted
child and his parents (and relatives) for all purposes, including inheri-
tance.1 17
X. JUVENILES
A. Children Under Need of Supervision
Section 39.02(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes (1971) provides that
juvenile courts shall have jurisdiction over "dependent and delinquent
children," but no mention is made of children under need of supervision,
and article V, section 5(b) of the Florida Constitution and section
26.012(2) now confer jurisdiction in the circuit courts since juvenile
courts have been abolished. The Supreme Court of Florida has held that
chapter 39 taken as a whole shows an intent to confer jurisdiction in
the circuit courts over children in need of supervision.88
The question of public school integration received a new twist in the
case of T.A.F. and E.M.F. v. Duval County which held that the state
had made out a prima facie case establishing that minor children were
in need of supervision as persistent truants from school "upon the bare
showing that they had failed to attend the public school to which they
had been assigned.""" The children were being taught by their mother in
their home, but she was not certified as a teacher nor did she have the
qualifications of a private tutor under state law. The court then held
that the children were not attending a parochial school under the aegis
of the Covenant Church of Jesus Christ because this church has not
been established in Florida and the childrens' father (an ordained minis-
ter of this church) did not hold services for others.
In the case of In re T.A.F.190 a juvenile court adjudicated that a
minor child was in need of supervision and incorrectly advised the parents
that they could appeal this decision within 30 days after they received
a copy of the court order rather than within 30 days from the entry of
the order. The District Court of Appeal, First District, held that a pro-
ceeding of this nature was analogous to a criminal case and that a child
is, therefore, entitled to a number of constitutional safeguards, one of
which is the rule that when. the court frustrates an appeal the abortive
appeal may be treated as a writ of habeas corpus in which the parents
.will be afforded a full appellate review of the court's order.
Provisional Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Cases were adopted
187. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-159, repealing FLA. STAT. §§ 63.011 to .291 (1971) and
828.031 (1969).
188. State ex rel. Price v. Duncan, 280 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1973).
189. 273 So. 2d 15, 17 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
190. 252 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
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by the Supreme Court of Florida. These rules are to govern juvenile
proceedings until permanent rules are submitted by the Florida Bar and
adopted by the court. 9 ' These rules are discussed in the Civil Procedure
Survey.' 92
B. Delinquency Proceedings
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that in order to adjudge a
child to be delinquent where the act of delinquency charged is one which
would constitute a crime if committed by an adult the required standard
is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' 93
When a finding of delinquency is based entirely upon a confession
and evidence discovered as a result of the confession given by a minor
who has not been advised of his constitutional rights, his conviction must
be reversed and he should be discharged.'
If a juvenile has been charged with possession of drug paraphernalia
she may not be adjudicated a delinquent upon the finding that she may
have used the paraphernalia. Juveniles as well as adults may not be
charged with one crime and then convicted for another. Further, the state's
burden of proof in juvenile delinquency proceedings is exactly the same
as in adult criminal proceedings. 19 5
It is reversible error to summarily revoke a juvenile's probation and
to remand him to the custody of the Division of Youth Services of the
State of Florida. The juvenile is entitled to a full hearing before his
probation may be revoked. 96
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has held that pro-
ceedings in juvenile courts are not criminal but civil in nature, hence
any time spent in a juvenile detention home (because of alleged lewd
and lascivious behavior) cannot be counted in computing the 180 day
period involved in the speedy trial rule as provided in rule 3.191 (a) (1)
of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.197 This case appears to be
inconsistent with the preceding four cases.
A finding of delinquency because of a violation of section 877.11 of
the Florida Statutes (1971) (inhalation or possession of harmful chemical
substances) does not require the submission of a chemical analysis when
other evidence supports the finding.' 98
191. In re Transition Rule 11, 270 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1972).
192. Massey, Hoffman & Linder, Civil Procedure, 1972-73 Survey of Florida Law, 28
U. MiAmn L. REv. 257 (1974).
193. State v. V.D.B., 270 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1972); accord, D.R.W. v. State, 271 So. 2d 114
(Fla. 1973) rev'g 262 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); In re G.H. v. State, 271 So. 2d 820
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1973) ; J.D.D. v. State, 268 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
194. In re J.R.H. v. State, 278 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
195. D.M.M. v. State, 275 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
196. State ex rel. D.E. v. Keller, 251 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971), aff'd, Keller v.
State ex rel. Epperson, 265 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1972).
197. State v. Bryant, 276 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
198. In re P.G. & G.G., 280 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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In appropriate circumstances, a court of competent jurisdiction
under rule 8.040 of the Rules of Juvenile Procedure may provide for
detention of juveniles; jurisdiction is not vested solely with "intake
officers." 199
C. Criminal Proceedings
Section 925.07 of the Florida Statutes (1971) requires that when
an unmarried minor is charged with a crime in Florida notice of the
charge must be given before the trial to his parents or guardian. The
statute imposes a duty upon the court to ascertain the name and address
of the minor's parents or guardian. If written notice to these persons is
returned by the post office because "[n]o such post office in State
named , °200 it is incumbent upon the court or its executive officers to
ascertain other reasonably available sources of information as to the
proper address.
The failure of the state to give a minor's parents or guardian notice
of the fact that the minor is going to be tried for a criminal offense
renders any conviction and sentence void and subject to collateral attack
by the minor.20
The act of a minor in telephoning his parents and saying that he
had been "busted ' 20 2 is not sufficient notice to them as required by
section 925.07 of the Florida Statutes (1971) when there is no evidence
that the parents knew the nature of the criminal charge against their
son, that it was a felony or in which court the case was pending.
A trial court, before finding that a minor accused is emancipated and
that notice of a criminal charge against the minor need not be given to
his parents, must, at the very least, attempt to communicate with the
child's parents and should not rely upon the minor's statement that he
has attempted to reach them and has been unable to do so. 23
A juvenile may waive his rights after he has been given the ap-
propriate Miranda 20 4 warnings by the police; the state bears a heavy bur-
den to establish that the minor intelligently waived his constitutional
rights . 20 5
In a well reasoned, well researched opinion, the District Court of
Appeal, First District, held that it would not constitute double jeopardy
199. Florida Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Patten, 277 So. 2d 320 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1973). The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for Palm Beach County did
not have the power in March, 1972, to direct the Division of Youth Services to receive and
treat a delinquent child in a facility different from the one in which the child had pre-
viously been assigned by personnel of the Division of Youth Services. In re J.N. & S.H.,
279 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
200. Warren v. State, 266 So. 2d 114, 115 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
201. Romero v. State, 276 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
202. McIntosh v. State, 274 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
203. King v. State, 281 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
204. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
205. State v. Roberts, 274 So. 24 262 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
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nor would it violate due process standards of fundamental fairness for a
juvenile to be tried for forcible rape even though he had already been
adjudicated as a delinquent for the same offense.2"6 Subsequent to this
decision, however, the juvenile brought habeas corpus proceedings in
the federal courts, and the Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, held that
any reprosecution of the juvenile would violate both conceptions of
fundamental fairness and the Constitution's protection against double
jeopardy. It would seem that the court implicitly characterized delin-
quency proceedings as being equivalent to criminal proceedings in order
to reach its decision. °0
D. Legislation
Physicians and osteopathic physicians who are licensed in Florida
may now furnish emergency medical care and treatment to a minor for
injuries and acute diseases without the consent of his parents if delay
would within a reasonable degree of medical certainty endanger the
health of the minor, provided, however, that this emergency medical
care is administered in a licensed hospital. The new act defines when the
parental consent cannot be obtained and provides for immunity to the
physician, hospital or college health service because of such treatment
provided that the care was in accordance with acceptable standards of
medical practice. 08
Section 959.022 of the Florida Statutes was extensively amended in
1973 to provide for the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
to implement state operated but regionally administered detention ser-
vices for children and for the state to take title to or lease some existing
county detention facilities. 209
The 1972 Legislature made a number of changes in the statutes
affecting the trials and detention of juvenile traffic offenders, and pro-
vided for the transfer of minors convicted of crimes from the Division
of Corrections to the Division of Youth Services, provided for com-
mitment of minors to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services by courts other than juvenile courts, and for investigations and
recommendations, adjudications of delinquency by courts other than
juvenile courts, and indeterminate commitments.210
A classical example of a special interest bill is presented by a
1972 act which provides that "[a]ny judge of any existing separate
juvenile court on February 1, 1972, who is not a member of the bar of
Florida, shall be eligible to seek election as county court judge of his
206. State v. R.E.F., 251 So. 2d 672 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1971), aff'd, 265 So. 2d 701 (Fla.
1972).
207. Fain v. Duff, 42 U.S.L.W. 2343 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1974).
208. FLA. STAT. § 458.21 (Supp. 1972).
209. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-230, amending FLA. STAT. § 959.022 (Supp. 1972).
210. FLA. STAT. § 316.045 (Supp. 1972).
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respective county." ' It is difficult to find a better reason for the
abolition of juvenile courts than this statute.
Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1972), which sets forth
the procedures governing juvenile delinquents, juveniles in need of
supervision and dependent children, has been completely revamped
to provide for, among other things, jurisdiction in the circuit court
(rather than in the former juvenile courts); jurisdiction over children
under the age of eighteen (rather than the former age of seventeen);
for detention of juveniles and the preliminary screening of juvenile
cases by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services; that
answers filed in proceedings must acknowledge that the juvenile has
been advised of his rights to counsel and of his right to remain silent; the
furnishing of medical services to juveniles under certain conditions,
etc.
212
Chapter 959 of the Florida Statutes (1971) which pertains to the
duties and functions of the Division of Youth Services and the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services has been revised as to
the duties of these agencies in the prevention, control and treatment of
juvenile delinquency and the operation of juvenile detention facilities. 13
XI. GUARDIANSHIP
A. Incompetency Proceedings
It is reversible error to adjudge a person incompetent when he has
received notice of the incompetency hearing two days before it is held;
when he was not represented by counsel; he did not attend the hearing;
he was never informed of the alleged acts showing his alleged incompe-
tency and the order of the court failed to indicate that he was incapable
of caring for himself or "managing his property, or [was] likely to
dissipate or lose his property or become the victim of designing per-
sons.
2 14
Section 394.22(4) of the Florida Statutes (1971) provides that
an opportunity to be represented by counsel shall be afforded to every
proposed patient, and if neither he nor others provide counsel, the court
may appoint counsel. The Supreme Court of Florida has held that this
statute does not make it mandatory for the trial court judge in an in-
competency hearing to appoint counsel, but the court must determine
whether counsel should be afforded and the failure to make a finding
invalidates the adjudication of incompetency. 15
211. Fla. Laws, 1972, ch. 72-i5O.
212. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-231, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01-14 and 39.19 (Supp.
1972), amending and renumbering FLA. STAT. § 39.20 as § 39.001, and repealing FLA. STAT.
§§ 39.16, 39.17, 39.18 and 39.181 (Supp. 1972).
213. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-241, creating FLA. STAT. §§ 959.001, .156, .185 (1973) and
repealing FLA. STAT. § 959.09 (1971).
214. In re Moyer, 263 So. 2d 286, 287 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
215. In re Hnat, 250 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1971).
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A person is mentally incompetent when he is incapable of managing
his own affairs, but when it is shown that a seventy-three year old
woman of considerable wealth has made only two bad investments
involving relatively small amounts of money and that she is alert and
capable of managing her affairs when she is not drinking (even though
she drinks to a degree which impairs her physical health) it is reversible
error for the trial court to refuse to restore the woman to legal compe-
tency.21 6
While a natural parent has a "God-given legal right to enjoy the
custody, fellowship, and companionship of his offspring, ' 217 this "right"
may be taken from the father when the maternal grandparents seek the
guardianship of a minor daughter who has lived with them for years
after her father killed her mother and it would be in the best interests
of the child that she remain with the grandparents.
B. The State's Right to Reimbursement of Costs
The Supreme Court of Florida in affirming the District Court of
Appeal, First District,218 and overruling the District Court of Appeal,
Third District,219 has held that section 394.22(13) of the Florida
Statutes (1971) (which provides that the State of Florida has a right
of reimbursement against the estate of a solvent incompetent for care,
maintenance and treatment furnished to him as a patient in a state mental
institution) is enforceable against the estate of an incompetent who
was committed before the adoption of the statute for expenses incurred
after the adoption of the statute even though the incompetent was ad-
judicated prior to the adoption of the statute. The court noted that it
was not giving the statute a retroactive application; any incompetent
who was committed prior to the adoption of the statute would not be
liable for services rendered prior to that date.
C. Legislation and Rules of Procedure
Sections 744.13 and 744.60 of the Florida Statutes (1971) which
deal with the definition of natural guardians and their powers to settle and
collect claims filed in behalf of minors has been extensively amended
to permit the natural guardians to settle a claim in favor of their minor
children in certain cases. Unfortunately, some of the changes make
little sense; for example:
[T]he natural guardians or guardian of a minor may settle any
claim by or on behalf of a minor that exceeds $2,500.00 without
216. In re McDonnell, 266 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
217. In re Guardianship of Davidson, 259 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972), citing
Johnson v. Johnson, 114 So. 2d 338, 341 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959).
218. Harrell v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 272 So. 2d 151 (Fla.
1973), aff'g 258 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
219. Kirk v. Wiggin, 242 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
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bond; [provided that] a bond may be required when the
amount of settlement exceeds $2,500.00, but no legal guardian-
ship shall be required unless the amount exceeds $10,000.00.22 0
Upon the death of a ward, a guardian may now pay $1000 as rea-
sonable funeral expenses rather than the former sum of $750.221
The Supreme Court of Florida has adopted amendments to the
Guardianship Rules of Procedure which were effective February 1,
1973 ;222 these rules are discussed in the Civil Procedure Survey.22
Guardians of veterans who receive funds from the Veterans Ad-
ministration for their wards now have authority to invest these funds in
credit unions which are insured under the federal share insurance program
or an approved state share insurance program.224
The statutory requirements governing the execution of deeds by
the spouses of incompetent persons and by guardians for incompetent
persons were extensively changed; now the joinder of the husband is no
longer required in the sale of the wife's separate estate and when both
spouses are incompetent, realty including homestead property may be
sold or encumbered by the guardians of the spouses.225
The guardianship laws have been amended to provide for "limited
guardianships." A "limited guardian" may be appointed in any case
involving an incompetent adult who is wholly or substantially self-
supporting in order to manage "only such property . as shall be re-
ceived from other than the incompetent persons's wages or earnings. 226
"Standby guardians" may also be appointed "to assume the duties of
guardianship or limited guardianship upon the death or adjudication of
incompetency of the last surviving natural or adoptive parent of an in-
competent person." '227 Florida nonprofit corporations which have the
power to act as guardians may be appointed guardians of the person or
property of an incompetent person.228
A number of changes were made in the statutes dealing with mental
health, including a new provision which authorizes the jailing of mentally
ill patients for no longer than five days in cases of emergency and a
requirement that the written consent of the parent of a minor patient or
the guardian of an incompetent patient must be obtained prior to the
220. FLA. STAT. § 744.60(2) (Supp. 1972), amending FLA. STAT. § 744.60 (1971). Another
example is FLA. STAT. § 744.13 (Supp. 1972), amending FLA. STAT. § 744.13 (1971).
221. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-94, amending FLA. STAT. § 744.68 (1971).
222. In re Florida Probate & Guardianship Rules, 271 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1972).
223. Massey, Hoffman & Linder, Civil Procedure, 1972-73 Survey of Florida Law, 28 U.
MIAmi L. REV. 257 (1974).
224. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-41, adding FLA. STAT. § 518.01(14) (1973).
225. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-61, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 745.15(2)(a),(3)(b) and (4)
(1971).
226. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-222.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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use of surgical procedures which require the use of a general anesthetic
or electroconvulsive treatment.220
The Advisory Council on mental retardation was abolished in
1973.280
XII. ILLEGITIMACY
A. Standing
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held in a case
of apparent first impression in the United States, that the putative father
of an illegitimate child does not have standing to seek an injunction pro-
hibiting the unwed mother from obtaining an abortion.2 ' 'the court noted
that the Florida Abortion Statute"' does not give the putative father
standing, and the United States Supreme Court cases 28 hold that the
decision to terminate pregnancy during the first trimester must be
left to the mother and her attending physician as based upon her right
of privacy.
B. Bastardy Actions
Under Section 742.021 of the Florida Statutes (1971) a suit for
bastardy may be brought in the county in which the mother resides or
in the county in which the alleged father resides, at the option of the
mother. The general venue statute, section 47.01 of the Florida Statutes
(1971), which provides that suit may be brought in the county wherein
the defendant resides does not have any application."
It is reversible error for a court to dismiss a complaint upon the
ground of lack of jurisdiction when a bastardy complaint is filed by a
minor female-plaintiff rather than by her guardian or next friend. Under
rule 1.210(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure the trial court
judge must determine whether it is necessary to appoint a guardian ad
litem or permit the minor plaintiff to amend her complaint by bringing
the action in her name by her mother as next friend. However, this
requirement is procedural and not jurisdictional. 2 5
Florida has adhered to the majority rule that the mother of an
illegitimate child "has a natural primary or prima facie right to the
custody of the child as against a putative father unless she is proved to
be an unfit person to be entrusted with such a charge. '28 6
229. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-133, creating FLA. STAT. § 394.459(3) (1973), and amending
FLA. STAT. §§ 394.459(1),(10),(12) (1971).
230. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-2, repealing FLA. STAT. § 402.14 (1971).
231. Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
232. FLA. STAT. § 458.22 (Supp. 1972).
233. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
234. Ferguson v. Little, 266 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
235. Smith v. Langford, 255 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
236. In re R.L.G., 274 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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It has been the rule in Florida that a woman cannot have her child
declared illegitimate and thus receive support for the child from the
putative father if she was married to another at the time of conception.27
However, the Supreme Court of Florida has refused to apply this rule
when the mother and the putative father assumed cohabitation during
her marriage to another; the child was conceived during this cohabitation;
the mother was divorced from her husband and entered into a common-
law marriage with the putative father after this divorce, and the putative
father acknowledged his paternity, furnished support for the child and
the birth certificate showed that he was the father. The putative father
also claimed the child as his on his income tax returns, and he obtained
a draft deferment on the basis of being a married man and the father of
a child.2"" In the instant case the mother was suing the putative father
for divorce and for child support, while the usual rule which prevents
the mother from alleging the illegitimacy of her child has arisen in
cases where the mother has sought support from a father who refused
to admit paternity or when the mother has sought to prevent a father
from gaining custody on the basis that the child was not his, while in this
case the father admitted the child was his.
The adage that truth is stranger than fiction was illustrated in
V.S. v. B.M.289 A woman was regularly having intercourse with two
men. She became pregnant and married one of the men. The child was
born and the parties were divorced. The trial court relieved the husband
of all duty to support the child. The woman then brought bastardy pro-
ceedings against the second man, and the trial court and the appellate
court agreed that in spite of the prior decree it would have to be pre-
sumed that the child was a child of the marriage and was legitimate.
Hence, the woman could not have a cause of action for bastardy. The
court noted that the child is deemed legitimate but will not receive sup-
port from either man.
In the bastardy case of B.B.S. v. R.C.B.2 40 a man accused of
bastardy was deposed and he invoked his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion sixty-one times. One of the questions he refused to answer dealt with
whether he had ever given any money to the mother of the child for its
support. Subsequently, in summary judgment proceedings the man filed
an affidavit which alleged that he had not given money for the support
of the child, but this affidavit was given to support his defense that the
statute of limitations had expired. The woman then requested the court
to order the husband to answer the questions on the basis that his
affidavit was a waiver of his constitutional privilege. The court held that
since the affidavit was merely given in support of his position with regard
237. E.g., Kennelly v. Davis, 221 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1969).
238. Sacks v. Sacks, 267 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1972), rev'g 254 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
239. 281 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
240. 252 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
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to the statute of limitations, it did not go to the merits of the case
which dealt with the paternity of the child and did not waive his right
to assert his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
In a case of apparent first impression in Florida, the District Court
of Appeal, First District, has held that a release given by the mother of
an illegitimate child to the alleged father is invalid even though at the
time of the release the alleged father had neither acknowledged the child
nor had he been adjudicated as the father. The court cited cases from other
jurisdictions upholding the validity of releases when the father had not
been adjudged to be the father nor had he acknowledged the fact of pa-
ternity, while denying validity to releases given after the father acknowl-
edged his paternity or had been adjudged to be the father. The Florida
court was of the view that to draw a distinction between releases given be-
fore paternity had been established and afterwards would be unconsti-
tutionally discriminatory as a denial of due process of law.241
The District Court of Appeal, First District,242 has joined the Third
District 243 in holding that section 742.031 of the Florida Statutes (1971)
which provides that the court in a bastardy action which finds the de-
fendant to be the father of the illegitimate child "shall further order the
defendant to pay the complainant . . . such sum or sums as shall be
sufficient to pay reasonable attorney's fee[s]" uses the word "shall" in
a mandatory fashion and, therefore, the trial court must award an at-
torney's fee. However, the same statute makes no mention of court
costs and the court held that it is a matter of discretion to award costs
against the defendant.
In a case of apparent first impression, it was held that a bastardy
action cannot be brought against the estate of a deceased putative
father who died prior to the filing of the suit unless the bastardy statutes
provide for survival of the action. The court held that the general Sur-
vival of Action Statute24  does not preserve the cause of action after the
death of the putative father.243
The statutory amounts provided for the support of an illegitimate
child by his father may be increased or decreased depending upon the
circumstances and ability of the father.240
C. The Illegitimate Child and His Equal Protection Rights
The United States Supreme Court has held that when the common
and statutory law of Texas provides that a legitimate child has a right
to support from his father during minority, it is a denial of the right of
241. Walker v. Walker, 266 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
242. White v. Means, 280 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
243. Sinith v. Wise, 234 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
244. FLA. STAT. § 46.021 (1971).
245. Carpenter v. Sylvester, 267 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
246. Plever v. Bray, 266 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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equal protection when the common law of that state refuses a like right
to an illegitimate child.247 This case is merely a continuation of recent
cases which have held that a state may not create a right of action in
favor of children for the wrongful death of a legitimate parent and
exclude illegitimate children from the same right,248 and that illegitimate
children may not be excluded from sharing equally with legitimate
children in the recovery of workmen's compensation benefits for the death
of a parent. 49
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that in a
wrongful death action brought for the death of a man, proper parties
plaintiff include the deceased's widow, a son by a prior marriage, as well
as the deceased's three illegitimate children and their mother with whom
the deceased had been living for nine and one-half years prior to his death.
The court also held it was not necessary for any earlier adjudication that
the alleged illegitimate children were, in fact, the children of the de-
ceased; this issue can be decided in the wrongful death action.25
0
Section 222.13 of the Florida Statutes (1969) provided that life
insurance "shall inure exclusively to the benefit of the surviving child or
children and husband and wife of" a deceased in equal proportions. In
a case of first impression in Florida under this statute, it has been held
that an illegitimate child comes within the statute even though the
father had not acknowledged the child in writing, as would be the
requirement if the child were claiming a right to inherit from his father
under section 731.29 of the Florida Statutes (1969).51
D. Legislation
The Florida Legislature has, at long last, adopted the principle
that any child who is born within wedlock as a result of artificial insemina-
tion is "irrebuttably presumed to be legitimate, provided that both
husband and wife have consented in writing to the artificial insemina-
tion. 2 52
XIII. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Torts
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that both parents of an
injured child are necessary parties in any action brought against a tort
247. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
248. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
249. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
250. Evans v. Atlantic Cement Co., 272 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
251. In re Estate of R.L.B., 259 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). The court held that
the applicable statutory law must be determined as of the date of the decedent's diath. Thus,
FLA. STAT. § 222.13 (1969) was applied although it had subsequently been amended. See
FLA. STAT. § 222.13(1) (1971).
252. Fla. Laws, 1973, ch. 73-104.
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feasor who has injured the child for medical expenses, indirect economic
losses and loss of the child's companionship. If only one parent brings
the action, he or she must either file as trustee for the other parent or
name the other parent as a party defendant. If one parent receives a
judgment as trustee for the other, then all such trust funds shall be paid
in the registry of the court for the benefit of the absent parent. 53
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has held that a wife's
cause of action for loss of consortium for injury to her husband is not
barred by a consent judgment which was entered into between the husband
and the defendant when the judgment did not find that the defendant
was negligent or that the husband was free from contributory negligence.
However, the wife would have the burden of proof that the defendant
was negligent and that her husband was free from contributory negli-
gence.254
Section 768.02 of the Florida Statutes (1971) provides that actions
for wrongful death of a decedent shall be brought by the widow and
if there is no widow then by the surviving minor children. The Supreme
Court of Florida has held that it was not the intent of the legislature in
enacting this statute to deprive dependents of a deceased person when the
original family unit has been destroyed through divorce or adoption, etc.
As a result, when a wrongful death action is brought by the widow
who is the second wife of the deceased, the first wife may intervene in her
own behalf and in behalf of the minor children of the first marriage. 5
In order to charge a parent for the tort of his child in using matches
in setting fire to a building it is necessary to allege that the parent en-
trusted the child with an instrumentality which because of the lack of age,
skill or judgment of the child may become a source of danger to others, or
that the parents failed to exercise parental control over the child although
he knew or should have known that injury to another was a probable con-
sequence.256
B. Crimes
A man who lives with the mother and her children and supports
them may be tried for the felony of willfully or wantonly, unneces-
sarily or excessively chastising "his child or ward" even though he is
neither the natural nor adoptive father of the child. "The statute was
enacted for protection of children, and is entitled to liberal construc-
tion. ,,257
253. Yordon v. Savage, 279 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1973).
254. Resmondo v. International Builders, Inc., 265 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
255. Garner v. Ward, 251 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1971), rev'g 237 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
FLA. STAT. § 768.02 (1971) was repealed by FLA. LAWS 1972 § 2, ch. 72-35, creating FLA.
STAT. §§ 768.16-.27 (1973).
256. Spector v. Neer, 262 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
257. Robinson v. State, 254 So. 2d 379, 381 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), construing FLA. STAT.
§ 828.04(2) (1971).
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C. Family Planning Legislation
Florida has adopted a "Family Planning Act" which is designed to
make family planning and maternal health care available to citizens of
child-bearing age of Florida. The act authorizes physicians to furnish
contraceptive information and services to minors under certain con-
ditions and authorizes the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services to implement a comprehensive family planning program. 5
258. FLA. STAT.'§ 381.382 (Supp. 1972).
